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Abstract
Gilles Deleuze’s thought is uniquely placed at the interface of post-structuralism 
and the speculative/ontological turn which marked the humanities in general and 
continental philosophy in particular at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
On the one hand, Deleuze shares with his post-structuralist contemporaries the 
commitment to Nietzsche’s project of overturning Platonism and the critique of 
representation. On the other hand, while post-structuralism for the most part 
unfolded under the aegis of Heidegger’s pronouncements on the end of philosophy 
and the overcoming of metaphysics, for Deleuze the critique of representation 
constitutes the necessary condition for the reaffirmation of philosophy’s rights to 
metaphysical speculation. In this respect, Deleuze can be regarded as an important 
predecessor to the speculative/ontological turn. Therefore an engagement with 
Deleuze’s thought presents an opportunity to better understand the current 
conjuncture in the humanities. This paper presents an account of Deleuze’s critique 
of representation by tracing his argument against representation and in favour of 
intuitive knowledge and speculative metaphysics through a close reading of a few 
select and particularly revealing places in Deleuze’s early writings.  The conclusion 
then places this discussion of Deleuze’s thought in the context of the recent turn 
in the humanities and continental philosophy away from post-structuralism and 
towards speculative realism.
Key words: post-structuralism, Gilles Deleuze, critique of representation, intuitive 
knowledge, metaphysical speculation, speculative realism, speculative/ontological turn.
1. Introduction
The critique of representation constitutes an essential aspect of post-structuralist 
thought.1 In fact, it could be argued that the critique of representation is the very 
thread that binds together otherwise disparate philosophical projects such as those 
put forward by Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault which are usually 
1 Needles to say, the account of post-structuralism offered here is merely one possible way of framing 
such a complex subject. For an alternative account that challenges some of the assumptions about 
post-structuralism presented here see Dillet (2013). I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for 
suggesting this important resource.
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all gathered under the post-structuralist banner. The anti-representationalism of 
these thinkers is to be understood in the context of their shared commitment to 
Nietzsche’s project of overturning Platonism.2 As Deleuze put it most succinctly: “The 
task of modern philosophy has been defined: to overturn (renversement) Platonism” 
(Deleuze 1994: 59). While Deleuze was the one to explicitly formulate this formidable 
task in terms of the critique of representation, it is not hard to recognize the close 
proximity of Deleuze’s project to Derrida’s deconstruction of “the metaphysics of 
presence” or to Foucault’s account (and critique) of the classical and modern episteme 
in terms of representation. However, there is a crucial difference separating Deleuze 
from these two thinkers. This difference concerns their respective perspectives on 
the fate of philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular. For Derrida and 
Foucault, the project of overturning Platonism is to be pursued under the aegis 
of Heidegger’s pronouncements on the end of philosophy and the overcoming of 
metaphysics.3 Deleuze, on the other hand, not only claims that he “never worried 
about going beyond metaphysics or the death of philosophy” (1995: 88) but also 
emphatically states to be “a pure metaphysician” (1981: 41–42). In this regard, while 
Derrida’s and Foucualt’s theoretical projects can be construed as constituting the 
very apex of the linguistic turn4 in the humanities (and philosophy in particular) of 
the twentieth century, Deleuze’s explicitly metaphysical philosophical project is to 
be understood as an important predecessor to the speculative or ontological turn 
which has marked decidedly contemporary continental philosophy and theory at 
the start of the twenty-first century.5 
Given Deleuze’s unique placement at the interface of post-structuralism and 
the speculative/ontological turn, an engagement with his thought presents an 
opportunity to better understand and evaluate the current conjuncture in the 
humanities. Deleuze’s critique of representation is paramount in this regard for 
it is precisely this aspect of his thought that makes it possible to appreciate the 
way in which Deleuze departs from his post-structuralist contemporaries, and the 
influence his thought has had on the contemporary reaffirmation of philosophy’s 
rights to metaphysical speculation. In order to elaborate on this, it is first necessary 
to explicate Deleuze’s account and critique of representation.6 While Deleuze’s 
confrontation with representation spans the entirety of his oeuvre, his most explicit 
2 “My philosophy is an inverted Platonism: the farther removed from true being, the purer, the finer, the 
better it is. Living in semblance as goal” (Nietzsche as cited in Smith 2012: 4).
3 For readings that would challenge such an account of Derrida and Foucault see for instance Han 
(2002), Deleuze (1988), Patton and Protevi (2003), Custer (2016), Rekret (2017). Here again I am 
grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making these suggestions.
4 While the term itself originated in the context of analytic philosophy, namely as the title of an 
eponymous collection edited by Richard Rorty (1967), it soon came to be recognized as an apt 
designation for the developments in the humanities in general and continental philosophy in 
particular of the second half of the twentieth century. For an account of the linguistic turn in 
continental philosophy see Colebrook (2010).
5 “The Speculative Turn” is the name of the first edited collection dedicated to speculative realism and 
published in 2010, while “The Ontological Turn in Contemporary Philosophy” was the name of a 
summer school in philosophy held at the University of Bonn (Germany) in 2012.
6 While Deleuze’s “critique of representation” is here interpreted as an attempt to argue against and 
move beyond representation, for an alternative reading of Deleuze’s position as an account of the 
phenomenological genesis of representation see Hughes (2008).
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and direct formulations in this regard are to be found in the early stages of his work, 
encompassing the period of his first published writings in 1946, and ending with 
the publication of Difference and Repetition in 1968. Furthermore, compared with 
his later works, which were in a state of constant terminological flux, Deleuze’s early 
writings exhibit a somewhat greater terminological consistency which makes them 
more appropriate for our purposes. Accordingly, we shall focus our attention on 
those select few places of his early writings where Deleuze states his case against 
representation as explicitly and unequivocally as possible.
2. Deleuze’s Reversal of Platonism
The project of overturning, or more appropriately in this context, reversal 
(renversement) of Platonism constitutes the framework in which Deleuze’s 
philosophical system in general and his critique of representation in particular 
unfolds, and this is therefore the first aspect of Deleuze’s thought that needs to 
be explicated. We will do so by way of a close reading of Deleuze’s “Plato and the 
Simulacrum”, a text explicitly dedicated to answering the question “What does 
it mean ‘to reverse Platonism?’” (Deleuze 1967: 253). Nietzsche himself, whom 
Deleuze credits as being the first to formulate this demand, seems to have believed 
that the reversal of Platonism implies the abolition of both the world of essences as 
well as the world of appearances. In “How the ‘Real World’ at Last Became a Myth” 
Nietzsche famously claims: “We have abolished the real world: what world is left? 
the apparent world perhaps? . . . But no! with the real world we have also abolished 
the apparent world!” (Nietzsche 1990: 51). But Deleuze warns against such an 
interpretation: “the dual denunciation of essences and appearances dates back to 
Hegel or, better yet, to Kant” (Deleuze 1967: 253), and thereby cannot be considered 
peculiar to Nietzsche. 
According to Deleuze, if we are to understand the meaning of the reversal of Platonism, 
we first have to track down and make explicit the motivation behind Plato’s theory of 
Ideas. And this motive is to be sought in “a will to select and to choose. It is a question 
of ‘making a difference’, of distinguishing the ‘thing’ itself from its images, the 
original from the copy, the model from the simulacrum” (Deleuze 1967: 253). Plato’s 
method of division is devised precisely in order to address this problem. In light of 
this, Deleuze highlights a distinction he sees as crucial for defining the motivation 
of Platonism more precisely. Plato, according to Deleuze’s reading, distinguishes 
between two kinds of images-idols: copies-icons on the one hand, and simulacra-
phantasms on the other. “Copies are secondary possessors. They are well-founded 
pretenders, guaranteed by resemblance; simulacra are like false pretenders, built 
upon a dissimilarity” (Deleuze 1967: 256). Following from this, the true motivation 
of Platonism, for Deleuze, is not to distinguish the Idea from its image, the original 
from a copy, or the model from a simulacrum; it has to do instead “with selecting 
among the pretenders, distinguishing good and bad copies or, rather, copies (always 
well-founded) and simulacra (always engulfed in dissimilarity). It is a question 
of assuring the triumph of the copies over simulacra” (Deleuze 1967: 257). So, in 
Deleuze’s interpretation, the true motivation of Plato’s theory of Ideas is to uphold 
the distinction between two kinds of images, namely copies and simulacra, and to 
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provide a criterion or principle of selection among them (Deleuze 1967: 257). Copies 
and simulacra are indeed to be distinguished in terms of their respective relations 
to Ideas. As we have just seen, copies can be said to be well-founded pretenders 
or good images because they are endowed with resemblance. But resemblance in 
this case is not to be understood as “an external relation” between two different 
things, but as an “internal relation” between a thing and an Idea. “The copy truly 
resembles something only to the degree that it resembles the Idea of that thing (...) 
It is the superior identity of the Idea which founds the good pretension of the copies, 
as it bases it on an internal or derived resemblance” (Deleuze 1967: 257). Simulacra, 
on the other hand, are images without resemblance, false images grounded on a 
dissimilarity. “That to which they pretend (the object, the quality etc.), they pretend 
to underhandedly (...) without passing through the Idea. Theirs is an unfounded 
pretension, concealing a dissimilarity which is an internal imbalance” (Deleuze 
1967: 257). Yet although simulacra “internalize a dissimilarity” and are “built 
upon a disparity or upon a difference”, they nonetheless produce an “effect” or an 
“impression” of resemblance: “but this is an effect of the whole, completely external 
and produced by totally different means than those at work within the model (...) an 
effect obtained by ruse or subversion” (Deleuze 1967: 258). 
Therefore, copies and simulacra can be said to constitute two opposite ways of 
arriving at resemblance. Two formulas encapsulate this dualism: “only that which 
resembles differs” and “only differences can resemble each other” (Deleuze 1967: 
261). According to Deleuze, 
these are two distinct readings of the world: one invites us to think 
difference from the standpoint of a previous similitude or identity; whereas 
the other invites us to think similitude and even identity as the product 
of a deep disparity. The first reading precisely defines the world of copies 
or representation; it posits the world as icon. The second, contrary to the 
first, defines the world of simulacra; it posits the world itself as phantasm 
(Deleuze 1967: 261–262). 
The world of copies or representation is a world founded by Platonism. This world, 
as we have seen, has the Idea or “the Same” as its foundation (that which possesses 
something in the primary way) and is populated by the copies-icons or “the Similar” 
(the pretender which possesses something in the secondary way in virtue of its 
resemblance to the foundation) (Deleuze 1967: 259). In this world, the simulacra-
phantasms, as that which is founded on difference and endowed with dissimilarity, 
are to be “repressed as deeply as possible”, and “shut up in a cavern at the bottom at 
the Ocean” (Deleuze 1967: 259).
Finally we arrive at Deleuze’s answer to the question with which we opened our 
investigation: 
So ‘to reverse Platonism’ means to make the simulacra rise and to affirm 
their rights among icons and copies. The problem no longer has to do 
with the distinction Essence-Appearance or Model-Copy. This distinction 
operates completely within the world of representation. Rather, it has to do 
with undertaking the subversion of this world – the ‘twilight of the idols.’ 
The simulacrum is not a degraded copy. It harbours a positive power which 
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denies the original and the copy, the model and the reproduction. (Deleuze 
1967: 262) 
Contrary to Platonism, for which simulacra are to be defined in negative terms as 
infinitely degraded copies, for Deleuze, “the reversal of Platonism” begins precisely 
with the affirmation of the positive power of the simulacra to deny the very distinction 
between the original and the copy upon which the world of representation is founded. 
By denying this distinction the simulacra are able to undertake the subversion of this 
world, and inaugurate in its stead a world of their own. In the world of simulacra, 
resemblance subsists, but it is produced as the external effect of the 
simulacrum, inasmuch as it is built upon divergent series and makes them 
resonate. Identity subsists, but it is produced as the law which complicates 
all the series and makes them all return to each one in the course of the 
forced movement. In the reversal of Platonism, resemblance is said of 
internalized difference, and identity of the Different as primary power. The 
same and the similar no longer have an essence except as simulated, that is 
as expressing the functioning of the simulacrum. (Deleuze 1967: 262)
Deleuze warns against conflating simulation with appearance or illusion: simulation 
designates the power of the simulacra to produce an effect, and therefore it is fully 
real (Deleuze 1967: 263). Deleuze invokes Nietzsche’s eternal return as crucial for 
the process of simulation and consequently the reversal of Platonism: “Simulation 
understood in this way is inseparable from the eternal return, for it is in the eternal 
return that the reversal of the icons or the subversion of the world of representation is 
decided” (Deleuze 1967: 262). According to Deleuze’s admittedly highly controversial 
interpretation, it is a mistake to read Nietzsche’s idea of the eternal return as an 
expression of a cyclical conception of time or as the eternal return of the same.7 What 
the thought of the eternal return affirms instead is the exact opposite, i.e. the return 
of the Different: “Only the divergent series, insofar as they are divergent, return” 
(Deleuze 1967: 264). It is precisely by affirming that only that which differs returns, 
that the eternal return constitutes the Same and the Similar: 
Thus, the eternal return is, in fact, the Same and the Similar, but only insofar 
as they are simulated, produced by the simulation, through the functioning 
of the simulacrum (the will to power). It is in this sense that it reverses 
representation and destroys the icons. It does not presuppose the Same 
and the Similar; on the contrary, it constitutes the only Same – the Same 
of that which differs, and the only resemblance – the resemblance of the 
unmatched. (Deleuze 1967: 264)
Finally, Deleuze reveals that the eternal return has the same function in the world of 
simulacra to the one that the theory of Ideas had in the world of representation, i.e. 
that it is a principle of selection: 
And it does not make everything come back. It is still selective, it ‘makes 
a difference’, but not at all in the manner of Plato. What is selected are all 
the procedures opposed to selection; what is excluded, what is made not 
7 For an exegetical account of the series of translation mistakes which resulted in Deleuze’s 
interpretation see D’Iorio (2011).
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to return, is that which presupposes the Same and the Similar, that which 
pretends to correct divergence, to recenter the circles or order the chaos, 
and to provide a model or make a copy (Deleuze 1967: 265).
So, to put it in simplest possible terms, “to reverse Platonism” is to reverse the relation 
between identity and difference which defines the world of representation. While in 
the world of representation, difference is to be conceived as subordinated to identity, 
in the world of simulacra, constituted as it is by the reversal of Platonism, identity 
is to be thought of as a product of difference which is affirmed as a primary power. 
If it is true that Deleuze’s entire philosophical enterprise is best read as a sustained 
attempt to reverse Platonism thus defined, there is little doubt that Deleuze’s 
masterpiece Difference and Repetition (1968) represents the most compelling chapter 
of this formidable venture. For it is in this book precisely that Deleuze undertakes his 
most systematic attempt to explicitly think difference and repetition as released from 
“the requirements of representation”; that is, to think “difference in itself” (or the 
simulacrum), i.e., difference not subordinated to identity; and “repetition for itself” 
(the eternal return of the Different), i.e., repetition not reduced to generality (or the 
eternal return of the Same). A complete account of Deleuze’s philosophical system as 
it is presented in Difference and Repetition is beyond the purview of this article, and 
our engagement with it will be restricted to those parts of the book where Deleuze 
develops further his account and critique of representation.
3. Aristotle and the Requirements of Representation
As we have previously learned, “the world of representation”, according to Deleuze, 
is founded by Platonism. But this should not be taken to imply that the world of 
representation is already fully established with Plato nor that it is simply to be 
identified with Platonism. In fact, Deleuze argues that it is only with Aristotle that the 
world of representation is fully established and difference completely subordinated 
to identity (Deleuze 1994: 127). For Aristotle, Plato’s method of division is a bad and 
illicit syllogism for it lacks the middle term, the mediation or the reason according 
to which it could decide the selection between false and true claimants (Deleuze 
1994: 59). In order to establish a genuine philosophical method, Aristotle supplants 
Plato’s theory of Ideas with his theory of the categories and it is with this gesture 
that, according to Deleuze, the world of representation is fully constituted (Deleuze 
1994: 127).
According to Aristotle, everything there is (Being) can be classified or divided into 
one of the ten categories: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, situation, 
condition, action, passion.  Aristotle conceives these ten categories as the highest 
genera (genos: kind or family) which can in turn be divided into species (eidos), 
which can then be further divided into subspecies and so on until we reach the level 
of the lowest species (infima species) and finally individual substances. A genus is 
divided into species by the differentia (diaphora), which are also called “specific 
differences” because they are defined by Aristotle as the difference that “makes a 
species” (eidopoios diaphora).8 
8 This account of Aristotle is indebted to Smith (2017).
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Understanding why Aristotle’s theory of categories in general and his conception 
of difference in particular are problematic for Deleuze should not be difficult. First 
and foremost, Aristotle clearly conceives difference not in itself but in relation to the 
identity of the concept. Generic, specific and individual differences, for Aristotle, are 
to be conceived in relation to the identity of the concepts of Being, genus, and species 
respectively. In order for two things to differ they first have to have something in 
common: they either have to belong to the same genus, or to the same species, or be 
in an analogical relation to Being (Deleuze 1994: 30). 
However, while Aristotle certainly applies the same general conception of difference 
across all the different levels of analysis, not all of the resulting particular conceptions 
of difference (generic, specific and individual) enjoy the same status in his system. 
In fact, as Deleuze highlights, for Aristotle “there is a difference which is at once the 
greatest and the most perfect, megiste and teleios” (Deleuze 1994: 30). In Deleuze’s 
reading, only contrariety in the genus (the opposition of predicates) or specific 
difference is, for Aristotle, deserving of the title of “the perfect and maximal difference” 
(Deleuze 1994: 30). However, as Deleuze notes, specific difference can be said to be 
“the greatest” only in relative terms. For, speaking in absolute terms, contradiction 
is greater than contrariety and generic difference greater than the specific one. And 
indeed, Deleuze argues, it is only in relation to the supposed identity of a concept 
that the specific difference can be called the greatest (Deleuze 1994: 31). Crucially, 
Deleuze concludes, “specific difference, therefore, in no way represents a universal 
concept (that is to say, an Idea) encompassing all the singularities and turnings of 
difference, but rather refers to a particular moment in which difference is merely 
reconciled with the concept in general” (Deleuze 1994: 31-32). It is precisely at this 
“Greek propitious moment” (Deleuze 1994: 29), at which the determination of the 
concept of difference is confused with the inscription of difference in the identity 
of an undetermined concept that the world of representation is fully constituted. 
All the other aspects of this world follow from this disastrous confusion. In order to 
understand better what these other aspects are we have to get back to the notion of 
generic difference.
As we have seen earlier, specific difference can be said to be the greatest and 
the most perfect difference only on condition of the identity of an undetermined 
concept. But compared to the generic difference or the difference between the 
categories as ultimate determinable concepts it is actually rather small, possibly 
even “insignificant” (Deleuze 1994: 32). For, as Deleuze argues, the categories are, 
strictly speaking, not “subject to the condition that they share an identical concept or 
a common genus” (Deleuze 1994: 32). Being is the only term to which the categories 
are subordinated. And Being, as Aristotle famously proclaims, cannot be a genus.9 
The argument goes as follows: genus cannot be predicated of its differentia. And 
insofar as differences are (or have being), Being cannot be a genus. From this Deleuze 
concludes that for Aristotle generic difference is of another nature than the specific 
9 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, III, 3, 998b22–7, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, 723: “It is not possible that 
either unity or being should be a single genus of things; for the differentiae of any genus must each of 
them both have being and be one, but it is not possible for the genus taken apart from its species (any 
more than for the species of the genus) to be predicated of its proper differentiae; so that if unity or 
being is a genus, no differentia will either have being or be one.”
Jelača M.: DELEUZE’S CRITIQUE OF REPRESENTATION ... Zb. rad. Filoz. fak. Splitu, 11 (2018), 35-57
42
difference (Deleuze 1994: 32).10 In short, while species or concepts in general are 
univocal, that is, they are said in a single and same sense of everything of which they 
are said, Being is equivocal, that is, it is said in many different senses. Categories are 
nothing but these different senses in which Being can be said (Deleuze 1994: 32-33).
However, while Deleuze does proclaim generic difference to be of another nature 
than the specific one, this should not be taken to imply that he considers the 
equivocity of Being to fall completely outside of Aristotle’s conception of difference. 
To say that Being is equivocal is not to say that all these different senses (categories) 
in which it is said have nothing in common. There is still a respect in which Being 
can be said to be an identical and common concept in relation to the categories, 
but not in the same manner in which the categories/genera themselves can be said 
to be identical and common in relation to their species. In other words, there is a 
“common sense” to all the different ways in which Being can be said (categories). But 
this common sense is not collective, that is, it does not have a content in itself which 
could be applied to all of its subsumed terms in the same manner. It is “distributed” 
and “hierarchical” instead, that is, it has content only in proportion to the categories 
of which it is predicated. This is why Deleuze argues that Aristotle’s equivocity of 
Being is to be understood in terms of “analogy” (Deleuze 1994: 33). 
Furthermore, according to Deleuze, “judgement” plays a crucial role in Aristotle’s 
equivocal conception of Being (Deleuze 1994: 33). To make a judgement is to predicate 
a concept of a subject. To do so is first and foremost to select and apply the appropriate 
concepts to the corresponding subjects. Or in Deleuze’s terms, it is to “distribute” 
Being or everything there is by partitioning the concepts to the appropriate subjects. 
This in turn implies a “hierarchization”, which corresponds to the second function of 
a judgment: for to distribute Being is to evaluate each subject and apportion it to its 
rightful place in the “great chain of being”. The faculty of judgement known as common 
sense allows us to apply concepts to the appropriate subjects, which in turns allows 
the faculty of good sense to evaluate each particular subject (Deleuze 1994: 33).
According to Deleuze, every philosophy of categories from Aristotle all the way through 
Kant (and Hegel) takes judgement for its model (Deleuze 1994: 33). The problem with 
this gesture, for Deleuze, is that “the analogy of judgement allows the identity of a 
concept to subsist” (Deleuze 1994: 33). For, as Deleuze further argues, “analogy is 
itself the analogue of identity within judgement. Analogy is the essence of judgement, 
but the analogy within judgement is the analogy of the identity of concepts” (Deleuze 
1994: 33). Finally, Deleuze concludes, this is why we cannot expect 
that generic or categorial difference, any more than specific difference, will 
deliver us a proper concept of difference. Whereas specific difference is 
content to inscribe difference in the identity of the indeterminate concept in 
general, generic (distributive and hierarchical) difference is content in turn 
to inscribe difference in the quasi-identity of the most general determinable 
concepts; that is, in the analogy within judgement itself. (Deleuze 1994: 33)
What remains to be seen is the status of the infima species (or the smallest species) 
in Aristotle’s system and their relation to the individuals subsumed under them. 
10 For an illuminating discussion of this particular aspect of Deleuze’s reading of Aristotle see Daniela 
Voss (2014: 40).
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Unsurprisingly, Deleuze once again notes how the logic of “the Small” reflects the 
logic of “the Large”: while the categories or “the large units (...) are determined 
according to relations of analogy, (...) the little genera or species, are determined by 
a direct perception of resemblances” (Deleuze 1994: 34). In other words, while the 
categories are determined by the relations of analogy between them with regards to 
Being, the smallest species are determined by the perceptual resemblances between 
the various individuals subsumed under them. Clearly, once again difference is 
subordinated to identity: individual differences are to be conceived in terms of the 
perceived similarity between the individual substances which belong to the same 
species.
Taken together these different aspects of Aristotle’s theory of the categories form 
what Deleuze terms “the requirements of representation”: “the identity of the 
concept, the opposition of predicates, the analogy of judgement and the resemblance 
of perception” (Deleuze 1994: 34). It is by forging these “four heads or four shackles 
of mediation” (Deleuze 1994: 29) that Aristotle has definitively enchained difference 
in itself and fully established the world of representation. 
4. Transcendental Empiricism from Bergson to Deleuze
As we have stated above, Difference and Repetition as a whole represents Deleuze’s 
most sustained attempt to release difference from these shackles of mediation and 
escape the world of representation. At various places in the book Deleuze refers to 
his philosophical project by the terms “transcendental” or “superior empiricism”. 
One passage in particular stands out in this regard: 
Empiricism truly becomes transcendental, and aesthetics an apodictic 
discipline, only when we apprehend directly in the sensible that which 
can only be sensed, the very being of the sensible: difference, potential 
difference and difference in intensity as the reason behind qualitative 
diversity. (...) The intense world of differences, in which we find the reason 
behind qualities and the being of the sensible, is precisely the object of a 
superior empiricism. (Deleuze 1994: 56-57)
This passage is best read in conjunction with a later one in which Deleuze clearly 
albeit implicitly refers to the same ideas: 
We have contrasted representation with a different kind of formation. The 
elementary concepts of representation are the categories defined as the 
conditions of possible experience. These, however, are too general or too 
large for the real. The net is so loose that the largest fish pass through. (...) 
Everything changes once we determine the conditions of real experience, 
which are not larger than the conditioned and which differ in kind from the 
categories. (Deleuze 1994: 68, tm)
The importance of these two passages for understanding Deleuze’s philosophical 
project in general and his account of representation in particular can hardly be 
overestimated. However, if we are to understand the ideas expressed here in full, 
it will be necessary to go back to Deleuze’s earlier writings where Deleuze can be 
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seen making virtually the exact same claims but explicating them in more detail. 
Deleuze’s various writings on Bergson are particularly relevant in this regard and 
we shall start our discussion by exploring a few relevant themes from Bergsonism 
(1966), Deleuze’s most systematic and complete account of Bergson’s philosophy. 
In Deleuze’s reading of Bergson, “experience itself offers us nothing but composites” 
(Deleuze 1991: 22); or to put the same point in other, slightly different, yet very 
revealing terms, “things are mixed in reality”, and “this mixture is our experience 
itself, our representation” (Deleuze 1991: 26, my emphasis). A composite, an impure 
mixture or a representation, for Bergson, is a “fundamental illusion” (Deleuze 1991: 
20) which can only be dispelled by dividing it “according to its natural articulations, 
that is, into elements which differ in kind” (Deleuze 1991: 22). Only tendencies or pure 
presences can be said to differ in kind, and therefore a composite or a representation 
“must be divided according to qualitative and qualified tendencies” (Deleuze 1991: 
22) or “pure presences that do not allow themselves to be represented” (Deleuze 
1991: 26). The task of performing such a division Deleuze attributes to Bergson’s 
notion of “intuition as a method of division, Platonic in inspiration” (Deleuze 1991: 
26). Deleuze here notes the similarities between Bergson’s intuition as a method of 
division and Kant’s transcendental method: “If the composite represents the fact, it 
must be divided into tendencies or into pure presences that only exist in principle 
(en droit). We go beyond experience, toward the conditions of experience (but these 
are not, in the Kantian manner, the conditions of all possible experience: They are the 
conditions of real experience)” (Deleuze 1991: 23). Not only does Deleuze present 
Bergson’s conception of intuition as a continuation of Kant’s transcendental method, 
but he also reveals in what respect the former supposedly represents an advance 
over the latter. A few pages later Deleuze reiterates this crucial point: “Intuition 
leads us to go beyond the state of experience toward the conditions of experience. 
But these conditions are neither general nor abstract. They are no broader than the 
conditioned: they are the conditions of real experience” (Deleuze 1991: 27). 
To further differentiate Bergson’s intuition from Kant’s transcendental method, 
Deleuze warns against construing the (Bergsonian) beyond-experience in terms of 
(Kantian) concepts: 
This going beyond does not consist in going beyond experience toward 
concepts. For concepts only define, in the Kantian manner, the conditions of 
all possible experience in general. Here, on the other hand, it is a case of real 
experience in all its peculiarities. And if we must (...) go beyond it, this is only 
in order to find the articulations on which these peculiarities depend. So that 
the conditions of experience are less determined in concepts than in pure 
percepts. And, while these percepts themselves are united in a concept, it is a 
concept modelled on the thing itself, which only suits that thing, and which, 
in this sense, is no broader than what it must account for. (Deleuze 1991: 27)
Clearly, the problem with Kantian concepts, for Deleuze, is that they are general and 
therefore inadequate to capture the real experience which is supposedly singular. Insofar 
as concepts on Bergson’s account are involved in the determination of the conditions of 
real experience, these concepts are supposed to be singular, that is, modelled on and 
suitable only to the thing itself, the thing which they are supposed to be the condition of. 
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To this capacity of intuition to go beyond real experience towards its concrete conditions 
Deleuze gives the name of “superior empiricism” (Deleuze 1991: 30). 
What this brief discussion reveals is that Deleuze’s project in Difference and 
Repetition is essentially a continuation of Bergson’s philosophical project. Even a 
cursory glance at the two passages from Difference and Repetition quoted before 
confirms that Deleuze characterizes his own project of transcendental empiricism 
in the very same terms to those in which he construes Bergson’s project of superior 
empiricism.  Just like Bergson before him, Deleuze too considers representation to be 
“a site of transcendental illusion” (Deleuze 1994: 265), a fundamental or inevitable 
illusion which has to be dispelled. And the only way to accomplish this is by going 
beyond experience, as it is given to us in representation, towards the conditions 
of experience. By construing his project in transcendental terms as the quest for 
the conditions of experience, Deleuze affirms his Kantian lineage.11 However, to 
the extent that Kant conceives the transcendental in terms of the inquiry into the 
conditions of experience in general or possible experience, he remains, according to 
Deleuze, beholden to the domain of representation. In fact, Kantian categories (as 
the conditions of pure understanding), for Deleuze, are the “elementary concepts 
of representation”, and as such are “too general or too large for the real. The net is 
so loose that the largest fish pass through” (Deleuze 1994: 68). Therefore, Deleuze 
argues, if transcendental philosophy is to think the real in its singularity, it has to 
become an inquiry into “the conditions of real experience, which are not larger 
than the conditioned and which differ in kind from the categories” (Deleuze 1994: 
68). Deleuze gives the name of “transcendental empiricism” to such a philosophical 
inquiry into the conditions of real experience: “Empiricism truly becomes 
transcendental (...) only when we apprehend directly in the sensible that which can 
only be sensed, the very being of the sensible: difference, potential difference and 
difference in intensity as the reason behind qualitative diversity” (Deleuze 1994: 
56-57). Here it is important to emphasize that Deleuze construes his transcendental 
empiricism in terms of a direct apprehension of the intense world of differences 
as the conditions of real experience. In positing the possibility of such a direct 
apprehension of the conditions of experience Deleuze is clearly following Bergson 
once again, namely Bergson’s affirmation of intuitive knowledge. In fact, it could be 
argued that Deleuze’s doctrine of “the transcendent exercise of the faculties” as it is 
elaborated in the central chapter of Difference and Repetition entitled “The Image of 
Thought” is nothing other than a reformulation of Bergson’s notion of “intuition as 
method of philosophy” (see Jelača 2014).
To fully grasp the implications of this, it is necessary to return to Deleuze’s 
discussion of Bergson’s notion of intuition in Bergsonism. According to Deleuze, 
the fundamental dualism for Bergson, the dualism which all his other numerous 
dualisms presuppose, is the one between duration and space. This dualism is based 
in Bergson’s appropriation and transformation of Bernhard Riemann’s distinction 
between two types of multiplicities, discrete and continuous multiplicities. In 
11 Deleuze’s relation to Kant’s critical legacy is notoriously difficult to disentangle and the account of it 
presented here is merely a sketch. For some of the most systematic and comprehensive scholarship in 
this regard (some of which would challenge the present reading) see Kerslake (2009), Sommers-Hall 
(2012), Voss (2014) and Lundy (2015).
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Riemann’s usage, discrete multiplicities are those that “contain the principle of 
their own metrics (the measure of one of their parts being given by the number of 
elements they contain)”, while continuous are the ones that find “a metrical principle 
in something else, even if only in phenomena unfolding in them or in the forces 
acting in them” (Deleuze 1991: 39). For Riemann, a mathematician and a physicist, 
these two types of multiplicities designate two distinct aspects of space. Bergson’s 
crucial advance over Riemann consists in the insight that the distinction between 
discrete and continuous multiplicities is to be applied to space and duration, with 
space being conceived in terms of discrete multiplicities and duration in terms 
of continuous ones. To be more precise, for Bergson, space is “a multiplicity of 
exteriority, of simultaneity, of juxtaposition, of order, of quantitative differentiation, 
of difference in degree; it is a numerical multiplicity, discontinuous and actual”; and 
duration is, in turn, “an internal multiplicity of succession, of fusion, of organization, 
of heterogeneity, of qualitative discrimination, or of difference in kind; it is a virtual 
and continuous multiplicity that cannot be reduced to numbers” (Deleuze 1991: 38). 
As we have learned above, experience, according to Bergson, always presents us with a 
composite which is to be divided according to its natural articulations into tendencies 
which differ in kind. Let us now supplement this by noting that this composite is 
always composed of space and duration. It might seem to follow that space and 
duration represent the two tendencies which differ in kind into which the composite 
is to be divided. But to see that such a conclusion would be overly hasty it will be 
enough to recall that for Bergson space is a homogenous and numerical multiplicity 
or a multiplicity of differences in degree while duration is a heterogeneous and 
continuous multiplicity or a multiplicity of differences in kind. In other words, only 
duration presents us with differences in kind. If the task of intuition as method is to 
divide the composite which is given to us in experience into articulations which differ 
in kind, and if only duration presents us with differences in kind, then it follows that if 
intuition is to achieve its task it has to think in terms of duration. And this is precisely 
the “fundamental meaning” of intuition: “intuition presupposes duration, it consists in 
thinking in terms of duration” (Deleuze 1991: 31). 
The evolution of Bergson’s conception of space parallels the evolution of his 
conception of duration and Deleuze shows how these two trajectories of Bergson’s 
thought merge together: 
Duration seemed to him to be less and less reducible to a psychological 
experience and became instead the variable essence of things, providing the 
theme of a complex ontology. But, simultaneously, space seemed to him to 
be less and less reducible to a fiction separating us from this psychological 
reality, rather, it was itself grounded in being. (...) The absolute, said 
Bergson, has two sides (aspects): spirit imbued with metaphysics and 
matter known by science. But the point is that science is not a relative 
knowledge, a symbolic discipline that commends itself only by its successes 
or its effectiveness; science is part of ontology, it is one of ontology’s two 
halves. The Absolute is difference, but difference has two facets, differences 
in degree and differences in kind. It can, therefore, be seen that when we 
grasp simple differences in degree between things, when science itself 
invites us to see the world in this way, we are again in an absolute (...). It 
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is, however, an illusion. (...) If the illusion can be repressed it is because of 
(...) duration, which gives us differences in kind corresponding in the final 
instance to differences of proportion as they appear in space, and already in 
matter and extension. (Deleuze 1991: 35)
From being conceived as two aspects of psychological experience, space and duration 
became for Bergson two aspects of being itself or of the Absolute. Furthermore, 
insofar as Bergson conceives space in terms of differences in degree, and duration in 
terms of differences in kind, Deleuze identifies being or the Absolute with difference 
itself. By the same token, insofar as science invites us to think the world in terms 
of differences in degree, while metaphysics inquires about differences in kind, 
these two disciplines constitute two halves of ontology as the science of being or 
the Absolute. And while space or differences in degree do indeed constitute one 
aspect of being, and science one of the two halves of ontology, it would be an illusion 
to think that science on its own can provide access to being itself or the Absolute. 
This illusion can be repressed and access to being secured only by metaphysics, 
which by way of intuition as its method reveals to us the articulations of the real 
or true differences in kind. Similarly, in the afterword to the English translation 
of Bergsonism Deleuze claims: “For Bergson, duration becomes the metaphysical 
correlate of modern science. (...) For Bergson, science is never ‘reductionist’ but, 
on the contrary, demands a metaphysics - without which it would remain abstract, 
deprived of meaning or intuition” (Deleuze 1991: 116). 
Deleuze, as we have seen, construes Bergson’s notion of intuition as method as a 
re-articulation of Kant’s transcendental method. It will therefore be instructive to 
briefly contrast Bergson’s project as we have sketched it here to basic tenets of Kant’s 
philosophy. Kant famously proclaims the impossibility of us having intellectual 
intuition and consequently attaining knowledge of things in themselves. Insofar as 
we do not possess intellectual but only sensible intuition, we cannot know things 
as they are in themselves (noumena) but only as they appear to us (phenomena) 
in experience. Therefore, we must not inquire about the essences of things but ask 
instead about the conditions under which they are given to us in experience. These 
conditions, for Kant, are constituted by space and time as pure forms of intuition, and 
categories as pure concepts of the understanding. Bergson, as we have seen, goes 
against all of these fundamental Kantian postulates. First and foremost, his intuition 
as method is nothing but a reaffirmation of intellectual intuition. Just as intellectual 
intuition would grant us immediate knowledge of the “in-itself”, so too Bergson’s 
intuition as method allows us to grasp the Absolute. Or to be more precise, insofar as 
the Absolute, according to Bergson, has two aspects, duration or differences in kind 
and space or differences in degree, intuition, which consists in thinking in terms 
of duration, allows us to immediately apprehend that aspect of the Absolute which 
pertains to duration. And seeing that, for Bergson, duration constitutes “the variable 
essence of things”, it follows that intuition allows us to grasp nothing less than the 
essences (or singular conditions) of things themselves. Furthermore, while for Kant, 
space and time constitute the conditions of our experience of things, Bergson in turn 
conceives space and duration (time) as two aspects of the Absolute or Being itself. 
In other words, while Kant construes his transcendental method in epistemological 
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terms, Bergson’s intuition as method is to be conceived in ontological terms instead. 
Clearly, Bergson’s intuition as method could hardly be any more distant from Kant’s 
transcendental method. While, for Kant, the transcendental method constituted part 
and parcel of his critique of dogmatic metaphysics, Bergson conceived intuition instead 
precisely as the method of his speculative metaphysics. Furthermore, while for Kant 
the goal of transcendental philosophy was to show how knowledge of the world which 
the science provides us is possible, Bergson, on the other hand, considered modern 
science to be abstract and incomplete if it is not complemented with metaphysics 
based on intuition. And this brings us to what may very well be the only real point 
of convergence between Kant and Bergson: both of them would certainly agree that 
science needs philosophy. But with regards to their respective conceptions of the 
nature of this relation, once again, these two could not be further apart. 
Now it is important to emphasize that Deleuze closely follows Bergson not only with 
regard to his critique of representation and the affirmation of intuitive knowledge, 
as we have shown before, but also with regards to Bergson’s account of the relation 
between science and metaphysics. Deleuze explicitly confirms this when he states: 
“I feel I am a pure metaphysician. (...) I feel that I am Bergsonian – when Bergson 
says that modern science has not found its metaphysics, the metaphysics it needs. 
It is that metaphysics that interests me” (Deleuze 1981: 41-42). One more place in 
Deleuze’s early writings on Bergson is of singular import in this context for it ties 
together all these various strands of thought that Deleuze inherits from Bergson. 
The passage in question is to be found in the text “Bergson, 1859 – 1941” (1956) and 
due to its significance is worth citing in full:
The first characteristic of intuition is that in it and through it something is 
presented, is given in person, instead of being inferred from something else 
and concluded. Here, already, the general orientation of philosophy comes 
into question, for it is not enough to say that philosophy is at the origin of 
the sciences and that it was their mother; rather, now that they are grown 
up and well established, we must ask why there is still philosophy, in what 
respect science is not sufficient. Philosophy has only ever responded to 
such a question in two ways, doubtless because there are only two possible 
responses. One says that science gives us a knowledge of things, that it is 
therefore in a certain relation with them, and philosophy can renounce its 
rivalry with science, can leave things to science and present itself solely 
in a critical manner, as a reflection on this knowledge of things. On the 
contrary view, philosophy seeks to establish, or rather restore, an other 
relationship to things, and therefore an other knowledge, a knowledge and 
a relationship that precisely science hides from us, of which it deprives us, 
because it allows us only to conclude and to infer without ever presenting, 
giving to us the thing in itself. It is this second path that Bergson takes by 
repudiating critical philosophies when he shows us in science, in technical 
activity, intelligence, everyday language, social life, practical need and, most 
importantly, in space—the many forms and relations that separate us from 
things and from their interiority. (Deleuze 1956: 23)
Arguably, this passage constitutes the single most straightforward and explicit 
metaphilosophical statement of Deleuze’s entire oeuvre for it reveals in unequivocal 
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terms the motivation behind his philosophical venture as a whole. It is thereby revealed 
that what is truly at stake in Deleuze’s critique of representation and the affirmation 
of intuition and speculative metaphysics is nothing other than the justification of 
philosophy itself. According to Deleuze, there are only two possible ways to justify 
philosophy’s relevance in the wake of the advent of the modern sciences. The first one 
relinquishes to the sciences the task of arriving at the knowledge of things, and restricts 
philosophy to a critical or reflective discourse on this knowledge. Kant was the one to 
set philosophy on this critical path. The other way is to affirm of philosophy itself the 
capacity to arrive at knowledge of things independently of the sciences. However, in 
order to justify this second path it is necessary to first show that scientific knowledge is 
in some way lacking, and that there is a need for philosophy to supplement it. This is why 
Deleuze, following Bergson, argues against representation, which, in Deleuze’s usage, as 
the above quote reveals, is a complex notion encapsulating not only the discourse of 
the sciences and critical philosophy but also “technical activity, intelligence, everyday 
language, social life, practical need and (...) space”. Representation thus conceived is, as 
we have previously seen, a fundamental illusion for the world that it reveals to us in 
experience is not all there is. There is an other aspect to this world and only a philosophy 
capable of going beyond representation can secure the knowledge of this other domain. 
Deleuze is adamant about not construing this other aspect of the world in transcendent 
terms and, in affirming the thesis of the univocity of Being, he upholds an immanent 
ontology instead – there is no other world, this world is all there is. However, to the extent 
that Deleuze construes his philosophical project in terms of a going beyond experience 
as it is given to us in representation, which, among other things, is constituted by the 
sciences, his philosophy quite literally is a metaphysics. And just like all the other great 
metaphysical philosophers before him, from Plato to Bergson, Deleuze too construes 
the knowledge of this other domain in terms of an intuitive or immediate knowledge. 
Finally, by construing this other domain that intuitive knowledge reveals in terms of 
temporal difference, Deleuze’s ontology truly is a reversed Platonism. As is well known, 
Plato presents a dualistic two world ontology: beyond the world of sensible appearances 
(images, simulacra, difference) existing in time, there is an other world of intelligible 
essences (Forms, Ideas, the Same) outside of time. Deleuze retains most of the distinctions 
which constitute Plato’s transcendent ontology but reformulates them in immanent 
terms. First, Deleuze follows Kant in substituting Plato’s disjunctive distinction between 
appearances and essences with the conjunctive distinction between apparitions and 
conditions of appearing (see Deleuze 1978). In this regard, Deleuze is a successor to 
Kant’s transcendental turn. However, while Kant conceives the transcendental in 
epistemological terms, i.e. as a quest for the conditions of the possibility of knowledge 
or experience in general, Deleuze, following Bergson, construes it in ontological terms 
instead, i.e. as the search for the conditions of real experience. What the engagement 
with Deleuze’s writings on Bergson reveals is that Deleuze’s often used formulation 
“the conditions of real experience” is to be understood as an ontological quest into the 
conditions of the actualization of things themselves or the world itself. Crucially, Deleuze 
also follows Bergson in postulating time or temporal difference as constituting such 
conditions of actualization. In a nutshell, whereas Plato believed in another world 
outside of time, for Deleuze, there is nothing beyond this world but time. 
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5. Conclusion
Let us conclude this discussion of Deleuze’s critique of representation and 
affirmation of speculative metaphysics by placing it in the context of recent 
developments in contemporary continental philosophy and humanities in general. 
The appearance of speculative realism has arguably been one of the most significant 
events in contemporary continental philosophy at the beginning of the twenty first 
century. Initially, “speculative realism” was meant merely as the name for a one day 
workshop held at Goldsmiths College, University of London in 2007, which gathered 
together four previously relatively unknown philosophers:  Ray Brassier, Iain H. 
Grant, Graham Harman and Quentin Meillassoux. Many things have been written 
about speculative realism to this day; however, the programme which announced 
the workshop still remains the best testament to what speculative realism was 
meant to be in the first place and due to its importance it is worth citing in full:
Contemporary “continental” philosophy often prides itself on having 
overcome the age-old metaphysical battles between realism and idealism. 
Subject-object dualism, whose repudiation has turned into a conditioned 
reflex of contemporary theory, has supposedly been destroyed by the 
critique of representation and supplanted by various ways of thinking the 
fundamental correlation between thought and world. 
But perhaps this anti-representational (or “correlationist”) consensus–which 
exceeds philosophy proper and thrives in many domains of the humanities and 
the social sciences–hides a deeper and more insidious idealism. Is realism really 
so “naïve”? And is the widespread dismissal of representation and objectivity 
the radical, critical stance it so often claims to be? 
This workshop will bring together four philosophers whose work, although 
shaped by different concerns, questions some of the basic tenets of a 
“continental” orthodoxy while eschewing the reactionary prejudices of 
common-sense. Speculative realism is not a doctrine but the umbrella term 
for a variety of research programmes committed to upholding the autonomy 
of reality, whether in the name of transcendental physicalism, object-
oriented philosophy, or abstract materialism, against the depredations of 
anthropocentrism. (Brassier and Toscano 2007: 306)
From a compromise umbrella term under which four divergent philosophical 
trajectories could be subsumed during a one day workshop, “speculative realism” 
soon came to be used as the name of a new movement in contemporary continental 
philosophy. But as it was obvious from the programme that announced the 
Goldsmiths event, speculative realism was never meant to be a unified philosophical 
movement, and given major divergences between its four main participants which 
became even more apparent (and insurmountable in some cases) with time, it 
is now clear that it never could have turned into one in the first place. However, 
while it might not be accurate to use “speculative realism” as the name of a unified 
philosophical movement, this is not to say that the tendency itself which it named 
was not real. In fact, it is my contention that “speculative realism” is to be understood 
precisely as the first name given to the tendency away from idealism and towards 
realism in contemporary continental philosophy which became quite apparent at 
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the beginning of the twenty first century. Many other names followed soon after, “the 
ontological turn” and “the speculative turn” being the most prominent ones. Each of 
these different names singles out certain aspects of this tendency as a whole. 
What initially brought together not only the four participants of the Goldsmiths event 
but also everybody else that enthusiastically accepted the advent of speculative 
realism was their shared repudiation of what Quentin Meillassoux famously termed 
“correlationism”. Meillassoux defines this notion in his seminal book After Finitude: 
An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency (2008): 
The central notion of modern philosophy since Kant seems to be that of 
correlation. By ‘correlation’ we mean the idea according to which we only 
ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never 
to either term considered apart from the other. We will henceforth call 
correlationism any current of thought which maintains the unsurpassable 
character of the correlation so defined. (Meillassoux 2008: 5) 
Given that Kant was taken to be the founder of correlationism thus defined, many 
believed that the rejection of correlationism implies a wholesale rejection of 
Kant’s critical project and its entire legacy. This was in turn then taken as a license 
for unbridled metaphysical speculation freed from the critical constraints Kant 
bestowed upon us. The argument could be reconstructed as follows: Kant was the 
one who proclaimed the impossibility of knowledge of things-in-themselves and 
critically delimited our knowledge to phenomena or things as they appear to us. 
In light of this, he posited as the task of philosophy the transcendental inquiry into 
the conditions under which things appear to us or the conditions of knowledge/
experience. Speculative realism breaks with Kant’s injunction against the possibility 
of knowledge of things-in-themselves. Therefore, to the extent that it affirms the 
possibility of such a knowledge it abolishes us of the obligation to critically inquire 
into the conditions of knowledge and licenses free speculation on the structure of 
reality. In light of such reasoning the term “speculative turn” seems most appropriate 
to refer to the tendency that we are describing here. The same point could be put in 
terms of “the ontological turn” that we have also mentioned before: given that Kant 
privileged epistemology at the expense of ontology, a repudiation of Kant implies an 
abandonment of epistemological concerns and a turn towards ontology.
As it was suggested in the introduction, Deleuze’s critique of representation can 
be construed as a particularly sophisticated instance of the “anti-representational 
consensus” characteristic of the humanities in general and post-structuralism in 
particular of the second half of the twentieth century. However, while it is certainly 
true that in this regard Deleuze is indeed a prime representative of the philosophy of 
his time, there is another respect in which Deleuze is to be considered an important 
predecessor of the speculative/ontological turn described above. In fact, it is safe 
to say that Deleuze (along with Alain Badiou), through the Anglophone reception 
of his philosophy beginning already in the 1990s, constituted the major impetus 
towards the said speculative/ontological turn. Utterly disillusioned with the state 
of continental philosophy at the end of the twentieth century and in particular 
with its post-structuralist textualist-idealist secession of thought from the real, the 
younger generation of philosophers found precisely in Deleuze their “line of flight” 
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from such a situation. Instead of interminable post-structuralist reflections on the 
conditions of (im)possibility of knowledge of the real, Deleuze offered this younger 
generation of philosophers an incredibly rich and audacious ontological account of 
the structure of reality, precisely of the kind that every other philosopher of his time 
claimed to be impossible. Soon enough Deleuze became by far the most significant 
French philosopher in Anglophone continental philosophy and his influence has 
not diminished significantly to this day. This brings me to the main point of my 
discussion. 
There is little doubt that Deleuze’s influence was at first extremely beneficial for 
continental philosophy for it allowed it to finally reaffirm again its long forsaken 
ontological pretensions. However, it could be argued that Deleuze’s influence 
has also had some quite pernicious side effects for these newly awakened realist 
ambitions of contemporary thought. As we have seen, Deleuze was quite unequivocal 
about his intentions to reaffirm the rights of philosophy to metaphysical speculation 
freed from any critical constraints. Therefore, it does not seem unreasonable 
to assume that the wholesale repudiation of Kant’s legacy outlined above was at 
least in part due to Deleuze’s influence. Now it is my contention that by following 
Deleuze in this regard contemporary continental philosophy is in danger of falling 
into a trap possibly even more insidious than the post-structuralist one it hoped to 
extricate itself from. If post-structuralism could be construed as the apex of Kant’s 
injunction against the possibility of knowledge of things-in-themselves, then various 
contemporary uncritical reaffirmations of metaphysical speculation mark the other, 
possibly even much more dangerous extreme. As was suggested above, the initial 
appeal of speculative realism was in large part due to its promise of doing away with 
the scepticism and relativism of post-modernism. However, the recent flourishing of 
various speculative metaphysical programs in contemporary continental philosophy 
reads more like a perverse realization of the proverbial postmodernist “anything 
goes” attitude than a delivery to this initial promise.12
The turn towards the work of the analytic philosopher Wilfrid Sellars (1912-
1989), initiated by Ray Brassier and followed by many others, most notably Peter 
Wolfendale, Reza Negarestani, Daniel Sacilloto and Fabio Gironi, can in part be read 
precisely as a reaction to this unfortunate conjuncture. What Sellars provides in 
this context is the much needed critical sobriety necessary to curb the speculative 
exuberances of contemporary continental metaphysics. Sellars’ most important 
contribution in this regard lies in his call for a return to Kant. Although originally 
voiced almost fifty years ago in the context of analytic philosophy of his time, Sellars’ 
famous pronouncement on the necessity of philosophy’s “slow climb back to Kant” 
(1967: 29), rings even more true today in the context of contemporary continental 
philosophy. In fact, Sellars conceived of his own philosophical project to a large 
extent as a rewriting in contemporary terms of some of the most important lessons 
learned from Kant. Among these, surely the most relevant for the present context is 
Sellars’ critique of the myth of the given which is nothing other than a contemporary 
reaffirmation of Kant’s injunction against the possibility of us humans having 
12 The worst excesses of this kind have been documented in painstaking detail by Peter Wolfendale in 
his book Object-Oriented Philosophy: The Noumenon’s New Clothes (2014). 
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intellectual intuition (see Sellars 1956). Human intuition can only be sensible and 
our understanding discursive or conceptual. It is only by combining the two that 
we arrive at the knowledge of the world. As soon as this critical insight is forgotten, 
the threat of idealism looms large. However, in contrast to Kant, for Sellars, the 
injunction against intellectual intuition does not preclude the possibility of us 
having knowledge of things-in-themselves. While Sellars certainly acknowledges 
“the gulf between appearances and things-in-themselves” as “a genuine one”, he 
nonetheless believes that this gulf can in principle be bridged by replacing “the 
static concept of Divine Truth with a Peircean conception of truth as the ‘ideal 
outcome of scientific inquiry’” (Sellars 1967: 50). In short, Sellars reinscribes Kant’s 
distinction between noumena and phenomena in terms of his distinction between 
“scientific” and “manifest images-of-man-in-the-world” (see Sellars 1962). Science 
and not philosophy can give us knowledge of the in-itself, albeit the in-itself is here 
to be understood in Peircean terms as the “ideal outcome of scientific inquiry”. 
Therefore, continental Sellarsians have found in Sellars not only the critical means 
necessary to counterbalance the speculative excesses of various contemporary 
metaphysical programs, but also the resources needed for the construction of a truly 
transcendental realism and/or naturalism.13 
One last question remains. If science, according to Sellars, gives us knowledge of 
the in-itself, what role is there left for philosophy? In his programmatic essay 
“Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man” (1962) Sellars proclaims that the aim 
of philosophy is to understand “how things in the broadest possible sense of the term 
hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term” (Sellars 1962: 1), or to fuse 
into one stereoscopic vision two competing perspectives on the world, namely the 
scientific and the manifest images-of-man in the world (Sellars 1962: 4). Compound 
this with another of Sellars’ important metaphilosophical statements: “The ideal 
aim of philosophizing is to become reflectively at home in the full complexity of the 
multi-dimensional conceptual system in terms of which we suffer, think, and act” 
(Sellars 1971: I, 3). If we compare these pronouncements with Deleuze’s views 
regarding the relation between science and philosophy encountered above, it is 
clear that Sellars upholds the very position that Deleuze argues against. Sellars 
relegates to the sciences the task of arriving at the knowledge of reality and reserves 
for philosophy the apparently much more modest task of reflectively understanding 
how the emerging scientific image hangs together with the manifest image. Deleuze, 
on the other hand, considers scientific knowledge incapable of apprehending reality 
in full and therefore in need of being supplemented by a philosophy that reaffirms 
its metaphysical ambitions to attain (intuitive) knowledge of that which lies beyond 
the reach of science. 
The alternative that Deleuze and Sellars exhibit here is as pertinent today in the 
context of the speculative/ontological turn in contemporary continental philosophy 
as it ever was. Any invocation of philosophical realism today faces a crucial question 
– what role is science to have in relation to philosophy’s reawakened realist 
ambitions? Deleuze’s and Sellars’ respective positions constitute two contrasting 
13 Brassier’s text “Concepts and Objects” (2010) can be taken as programmatic in this regard. See also 
Wolfendale (2013).
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ways of addressing this question. The first option is to take the same path as Deleuze 
and affirm the ability of philosophy to know the real independently of science. This 
in turn implies postulating, again with Deleuze, an other knowledge of things to the 
one that science provides. If scientific knowledge is representational then this other 
knowledge can only be immediate or intuitive and philosophy that asserts such 
intuitive knowledge a speculative metaphysics. For those, on the other hand, who 
remain committed to Kant’s injunction against the possibility of intellectual intuition 
and by extension Sellars’ critique of the myth of the given this is clearly not the path to 
take. The only other option is to go down the same road as Sellars and try to develop 
a philosophical realism in alliance with the sciences instead of in a supposed rivalry 
with them. Barring the postulation of some kind of intuitive knowledge, it is hard to 
see in what way philosophy alone could meaningfully lay claim to a knowledge of the 
real. If, following Kant, knowledge is construed in terms of representation as a result 
of the synthesis of sensible intuition and conceptual understanding, then knowledge 
of the real is out of bounds of a priori philosophical speculation and attainable only 
by empirical scientific inquiry. Where does that leave philosophy at? Pace Deleuze 
and all those who share his concerns in this regard, it must be emphasized that by 
delegating to the sciences the task of arriving at the knowledge of the real philosophy 
has by no means made itself either a servant to the sciences (as it is too often put), 
nor redundant. In fact, quite the opposite is true – it is only by acknowledging 
its constitutive limitations and dividing the cognitive labour with the empirical 
sciences that philosophy can truly move forward and retain its relevance today. In 
this division of labour, what philosophy can lay claim to is the conceptual realm. Now 
depending on the manner in which this conceptual realm is construed, the specific 
metaphilosophical position one upholds will vary. Sellars conceives “concepts” 
in normative terms as rules of inference. By construing the conceptual realm in 
normative terms Sellars has secured for philosophy an important place in relation 
to the sciences: while the sciences explore and describe the structure of reality, only 
philosophy has the resources to address and investigate the normative-conceptual 
realm or the “logical space of reasons” (Sellars 1956: 169) in which every knowledge 
(and by extension, every empirical-scientific) claim is placed. The redeployment of 
Sellars’ metaphilosophical framework in the context of contemporary continental 
invocations of realism by Ray Brassier and others has been met with two contrasting 
reactions. On the one hand, Graham Harman has made the proverbial accusation 
of scientism against this line of thought (see Harman in Iliadis (2013)). However, 
even the mere sketch of Sellars’ metaphilosophical perspective presented above 
should be enough to make it obvious that such an accusation is misguided at best 
and intentionally deceiving at worst. On the other hand, Scott Bakker has made the 
exact opposite claim to the effect that the contemporary continental invocation of 
Sellarsian normativism is nothing but a desperate attempt to rescue philosophy from 
the unstoppable advances of the sciences by circumscribing a conceptual domain 
over which only philosophy presides (see Bakker 2015). According to Bakker, all 
similar historical attempts to determine a priori what sciences can and cannot know 
have had a poor track record, and there is no reason to believe it will be different 
this time around. Nothing can be proclaimed as in principle beyond the reach of 
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science, and neither should the conceptual-normative realm be construed as such. 
Continental Sellarsianism traces its path between these two extremes of uncritical 
metaphysical speculation independent from scientific knowledge on the on hand, 
and an unabashed scientism on the other, in order to develop a transcendental 
realism which would inquire into the structure of the real together with the sciences 
but irreducible to them. In its attempt to rehabilitate representation in the face of the 
“anti-representational consensus” of the humanities and its ambition to renegotiate 
the notoriously contentious relationship continental philosophy has had with the 
sciences, this project constitutes arguably the most compelling and sustained effort 
to definitively break with continental orthodoxy and deliver on the promise of the 
initial speculative realism workshop.
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DELEUZEOVA KRITIKA REPREZENTACIJE IZMEĐU  
POSTSTRUKTURALIZMA I SPEKULATIVNOG REALIZMA
Sažetak
Misao Gillesa Deleuzea smještena je na razmeđu poststrukturalizma i spekulativnog/
ontološkog obrata koji je početkom dvadeset prvog stoljeća obilježio humanistiku i 
kontinentalnu filozofiju. S jedne strane, Deleuze sa svojim poststrukturalističkim 
suvremenicima dijeli predanost Nietzscheovu projektu prevrata platonizma i kritike 
reprezentacije. S druge strane, dok se poststrukturalizam najvećim dijelom odvijao 
pod znakom Heideggerovih proglasa o kraju filozofije i nadilaženju metafizike, za 
Deleuzea kritika reprezentacije predstavlja nužan uvjet reafirmacije prava filozofije 
na metafizičku spekulaciju. U ovom pogledu Deleuzea se može smatrati važnim 
prethodnikom spekulativnog/ontološkog obrata, stoga je bavljenje njegovom mišlju 
prilika za bolje razumijevanje trenutačnog stanja humanistike. Ovaj rad predstavlja 
Deleuzeovu kritiku reprezentacije u korist intuitivne spoznaje i spekulativne 
metafizike pomnim čitanjem nekoliko važnih mjesta Deleuzeovih ranih radova. U 
zaključku se ovo bavljenje Deleuzeovom mišlju smješta u kontekst recentnog obrata 
od poststrukturalizma k spekulativnom realizmu u humanistici i kontinentalnoj 
filozofiji. 
Ključne riječi: poststrukturalizam, Gilles Deleuze, kritika reprezentacije, intuitivna 
spoznaja, metafizička spekulacija, spekulativni realizam, spekulativni/ontološki 
obrat
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